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Across the nation, large budget gaps are forc-
ing state governments to make tough policy
choices. While some states are trying to control
spending, others are turning to tax increases to
balance their budgets. Some state officials are
trying to pass the buck for their poor fiscal man-
agement by pleading for a bailout from
Washington. But a bailout would encourage
states to continue overspending, which is the
source of the current fiscal mess.
The states’ mistake was to allow rapid tax rev-
enue growth during the 1990s to fuel an unsus-
tainable expansion in spending. Between fiscal
years 1990 and 2001, state tax revenue grew 86
percent—more than the 55 percent of inflation
plus population growth. If states had limited
spending growth to that benchmark, budgets
would have been $93 billion smaller by FY01—
representing savings roughly twice the size of
today’s state budget gaps. If revenue growth
higher than the benchmark had been given back
to taxpayers in permanent tax cuts and annual
rebates, rebates could have been temporarily
suspended during FY02 and FY03 to provide a
cushion with which to balance state budgets.
Current budget gaps provide policymakers
an opportunity to weed out the budget excesses
built up during the past decade. Yet overall state
spending continues to grow. After soaring 8.0
percent in FY01, state general fund spending
has not been cut in FY02 or FY03 even as large
budget gaps have appeared. 
States should impose tax and spending growth
caps to prevent budgets from growing too quickly
during the next boom. Revenue growth above a
benchmark would be given back in tax cuts and tax
rebates. That would prevent spending from increas-
ing too quickly and provide the option of suspend-
ing rebates during slowdowns to close budget gaps
without the damage caused by tax rate increases. 
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Introduction
State policymakers are looking for ways to
close large budget gaps during their 2003 leg-
islative sessions. Budget gap estimates are
changing all the time but have recently
ranged from about $17 billion to $50 billion
for the 50 states as a whole.1 Unlike the fed-
eral government, states have legal require-
ments to balance their budgets. Thus, legisla-
tors face tough fiscal tradeoffs. 
Some state lawmakers are pushing for fur-
ther tax increases on the heels of an aggregate
state tax increase of more than $8 billion in
fiscal year 2002 (effective for FY03), which
was the largest net increase in a decade.2 But
tax hikes will not solve the overspending
problem that prevailed in the states during
the past decade. Groups such as the National
Governors Association and the National
Conference of State Legislatures have misdi-
agnosed the cause of the states’ current trou-
bles and pointed fingers everywhere but at
state lawmakers themselves. Those groups
say that the tidal wave of red ink is caused by
external factors, such as federal mandates
and supposed “structural problems.” NGA
executive director Raymond Scheppach
argues that “structural problems states have
in their tax base will continue to undermine
a recovery in state revenues.”3
Some pundits are blaming the tax cuts of
the 1990s for current state budget troubles.4
Data from the National Association of State
Budget Officers show that net state tax cuts in
the late 1990s (FY95 to FY01) totaled $33 bil-
lion.5 But those cuts were not enough to
return to taxpayers the $36 billion in net state
tax increases that occurred during the early
1990s (FY90 to FY94). With 2002’s $8 billion
in state tax increases, and increases in FY03,
taxpayers will be even further in the hole. 
State officials are blaming the federal gov-
ernment for their budget woes and calling for
greater federal aid to the states.6 The nation’s
Democratic governors are asking for a $50
billion federal bailout.7 The Bush adminis-
tration has offered the states $3.6 billion.8
But the federal government has its own $200
billion or more deficit problem, and, of
course, the taxpayers who pay the federal bills
are the same ones who live in the 50 states
and pay state taxes. 
Nonetheless, there is a drumbeat for a fed-
eral taxpayer bailout. Bob Herbert of the New
York Times has called for a revenue-sharing
plan between the federal government and the
states, which would mean that citizens of fis-
cally responsible states would have to sup-
port the mismanaged budgets of states such
as California.9 The Washington Post’s David
Broder has also called for increased federal
aid to states, claiming that “the problem is
not that states are profligate spenders.”10
In fact, rapid state spending growth is
exactly the problem, as shown in Figure 1.
While inflation averaged just 2.8 percent
annually from FY90 to FY01, state general
fund spending grew at an average rate of 5.7
percent, according to NASBO. Total state
general fund spending grew particularly
rapidly at the end of the 1990s, with growth
of 7.0 percent in FY99, 6.6 percent in FY2000,
and 8.0 percent in FY01.11 Even as economic
growth slowed and budget gaps appeared,
state spending still increased 1.1 percent in
FY02, and it is expected to increase further in
FY03.12 Despite the word “crisis” being
thrown around by state officials, Figure 1
does not suggest a crisis in state spending at
all; it simply suggests a slowdown from prior
rapid growth rates. 
This paper reviews state budget growth
during the 1990s, provides a state-by-state
calculation of excess budget growth, and
examines the inverse relationship between
taxes and economic growth. The authors
conclude that states should turn current
budget problems into opportunities to weed
out the excessive spending that was added
during the boom years of the 1990s.
Spending cuts would allow states to avoid tax
increases that would delay economic recov-
ery. In the longer term, states should enact
caps on budget growth to avoid repeating the
excesses of the 1990s during the next eco-
nomic growth cycle. 
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Revenue “Shortfalls” or
Spending Excesses?
Few governors or state legislators seem to
have learned the lessons from the economic
recession a decade ago. In the boom of the
1980s, the states added many costly new pro-
grams, and when the economy went into
recession in the early 1990s states found
themselves in financial trouble.13 Then-gov-
ernor Mario Cuomo of New York declared,
“We’re broke to the marrow of the bone.”14
Today, governors are using similar hyperbole
as state revenues stagnate and political
demands to meet new spending commit-
ments rise. 
State government officials proclaim
themselves innocent victims of revenue
“shortfalls.” But are states suffering from rev-
enue shortfalls or spending excesses?
Consider that the budget gaps being report-
ed are partly fictions created by prior budget
forecasts that were far too optimistic—sort of
like sales growth forecasts for telecom com-
panies in the 1990s. Suppose that a fictitious
Governor Spendthrift had planned for a 6
percent rise in her state budget, but Governor
Frugal planned for an increase of 3 percent.
Then suppose that actual revenue growth in
both states turned out to be 3 percent. That
would be no problem for Frugal. But
Spendthrift would describe her situation as a
3 percent “shortfall.” Yet Spendthrift’s actual
problem is a “spending excess” caused by an
overly optimistic budget plan.
Another variation on the shortfall theme
is the supposed identification of “structural
shortfalls.” Several states have used this
bogeyman as an excuse to push for broad-
based tax increases. It is said, for example,
that Internet sales are eating away at state
sales tax bases. Yet U.S. Department of
Commerce data show that Internet sales are
still only about 1 percent of all U.S. retail
sales, thus hardly posing a current threat.15
Supposed structural shortfalls are
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Figure 1
General Fund Spending in the 50 States, FY90–03
Source: NASBO, “Fiscal Survey of the States,” November 2002 and prior issues. FY02 and FY03 are preliminary.
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nowhere to be seen in state tax revenue data.
U.S. Bureau of the Census data show that
total state tax collections grew 7.1 percent in
FY98, 5.2 percent in FY99, 8.0 percent in
FY2000, and 3.7 percent in FY01.16 On a cal-
endar year basis, total state and local rev-
enues rose 3.9 percent in 2001, and they will
rise about 3.4 percent in 2002 based on three
quarters of data.17 (State and local spending
rose 4.8 percent in the first three quarters of
2002, compared to the same period in
2001.)18 Excluding fast-growing federal aid to
states, revenues still inched 1.8 percent high-
er in 2001 and at least 1.0 percent higher in
2002. While state and local income tax col-
lections fell substantially in 2002, sales tax
revenue rose. Once the economy returns to a
strong growth path, revenues can be expected
to grow at the previous robust rate. 
During the 1990s, large tax revenue
increases occurred despite substantial state
tax cuts. Indeed, total state tax revenues grew
$186 billion between 1994 and 2001 ($374
billion to $560 billion), even though states
enacted net tax cuts of $33 billion. During
economic expansions, income tax revenues
tend to grow faster than incomes because
taxpayers pay higher average rates as their
earnings rise. Also, most states do not index
tax brackets for inflation as the federal gov-
ernment does, thus subjecting state taxpay-
ers to bracket creep.19
Figure 2 shows that during the 1990s the
growth of state tax revenues substantially
exceeded the benchmark of inflation plus
population growth. Revenue growth at the
benchmark rate would have kept the real per
capita burden on taxpayers unchanged. The
top line in Figure 2 shows actual total state tax
revenue. The bottom line shows what revenue
would have been if growth since FY90 had
been limited to the benchmark—and excess
revenues returned to taxpayers. If budgets had
grown at that more reasonable rate, state tax
revenue after rebates would have been $467
billion in FY01, $93 billion less than actual
revenue. Instead, that excess revenue was being
spent in FY01—extra spending that the states
and taxpayers could not afford when the eco-
nomic slowdown came in FY02. (Note that
Figure 2 shows that state revenue grew by less
than the benchmark in FY91 because of the
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$93 Billion Tax Revenue Windfall by 2001
Source: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census data.
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recession, but that shortfall was quickly
recouped in 1992. We could have started
Figure 2 in a year other than 1990 to illustrate
how excess revenue growth accumulates over
time. The illustration simply shows that,
regardless of when budget growth controls are
enacted and tax cuts are implemented, taxpay-
er savings will accumulate over time.)
State coffers become flush with revenues
during economic booms, prompting politi-
cians to expand eligibility for programs and
to launch expensive multiyear projects,
which nearly always end up far over budget.
Consider the boom year of FY01 when aggre-
gate state spending grew by 8 percent. Did
citizens’ needs for government services sud-
denly increase by 8 percent that year? Instead,
it is more likely that the easy money simply
encouraged legislators to avoid responsible
tradeoffs and to spend with much less
restraint than usual.
An alternative budget approach could have
been taken by the states during the 1990s.
Suppose half of the revenue windfall above the
benchmark of population growth plus infla-
tion had been given back to taxpayers in per-
manent tax cuts and the other half given back
in annual tax rebates. Annual rebates would
act as a fiscal buffer when economic down-
turns occur. As tax revenues stagnated in 2002
and 2003, states could have temporarily sus-
pended rebates and cut spending until rev-
enues recovered, without resorting to eco-
nomically damaging tax rate increases. 
The “structural” problem that faces state
budgets is that revenues rise too quickly dur-
ing economic booms and cause politicians to
overspend. The solution is a combination of
permanent tax cuts and annual tax rebates to
give back excess revenue above a benchmark
growth rate. We propose a benchmark of
inflation plus population growth, but other
benchmarks are possible. The important
thing is that spending growth be limited dur-
ing the booms by rebating excess revenues to
taxpayers. 
In addition to implementing budget
growth controls, state policymakers should
always look for unneeded programs to termi-
nate, as well as programs to privatize when
businesses are better able to provide services.
One approach to eliminating unnecessary
state spending is the enactment of “sunset”
laws.20 Texas has perhaps the most successful
sunset law of the 16 or so states that use such
budget procedures. Sunsetting is a process of
automatically terminating government agen-
cies and programs after a period of time—per-
haps five years—unless they are specifically
reauthorized. State sunset commissions
review programs on a rotating basis and rec-
ommend major overhauls, privatization, or
elimination. Widespread sunsetting would
help states avoid overspending by reforming
state governments on an ongoing basis.
Excess Spending by State
Figure 2 shows that if state governments, in
aggregate, had limited annual spending growth
to a benchmark of inflation plus population
growth beginning in FY90, they would have gen-
erated savings of $93 billion by FY01. That
excess amounts to $878 per household, on aver-
age, across the 50 states. However, fiscal trends
have varied considerably among the states, as
shown in Table 1. The table shows each state’s
actual FY90 and FY01 tax revenue, based on U.S.
Bureau of the Census data.21 The percentage
increase in tax revenue is compared to growth in
the benchmark of inflation plus state popula-
tion growth. The right-hand columns in the
table show the tax windfall, or excess, that states
received above the benchmark growth amount. 
The table ranks states by the size of the per
household tax windfall state governments
enjoyed at the expense of taxpayers. The five
states with the largest per household windfalls
were Connecticut ($2,408), Vermont ($2,350),
California ($1,899), New Hampshire ($1,779),
and Minnesota ($1,584). This is the amount of
money taxpayers would have saved per year by
2001 if budgets had been limited to bench-
mark growth rates during the decade. In only
three states, South Carolina, Arizona, and
Alaska, did tax revenues grow more slowly
than the benchmark.
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State Tax Revenue Windfall, FY90–01
Actual Tax Revenue Benchmark Per Year Tax Windfall by 2001:
Growth in Revenue in Excess of Benchmark
1990 2001 Population Per
($ millions) ($ millions) Increase plus Inflation $ millions Household Rank
U.S. Total $300,490 $559,765 86% 55% $93,319 $878
Connecticut $5,268 $10,590 101% 41% $3,152 $2,408 1
Vermont $666 $1,553 133% 48% $570 $2,350 2
California $43,419 $90,454 108% 57% $22,248 $1,899 3
New Hampshire $595 $1,776 198% 54% $861 $1,779 4
Minnesota $6,819 $13,535 98% 54% $3,034 $1,584 5
Massachusetts $9,369 $17,225 84% 44% $3,764 $1,533 6
Michigan $11,343 $22,264 96% 46% $5,743 $1,509 7
Arkansas $2,261 $4,911 117% 55% $1,403 $1,336 8
Utah $1,768 $4,065 130% 79% $909 $1,276 9
North Dakota $677 $1,231 82% 34% $321 $1,264 10
New Jersey $10,434 $19,253 85% 49% $3,736 $1,209 11
Nebraska $1,513 $3,028 100% 47% $803 $1,204 12
Colorado $3,069 $7,567 147% 82% $1,989 $1,168 13
Rhode Island $1,233 $2,243 82% 43% $479 $1,163 14
Wyoming $612 $1,124 84% 47% $222 $1,144 15
Delaware $1,130 $2,174 92% 62% $344 $1,134 16
Idaho $1,139 $2,558 125% 78% $533 $1,112 17
Mississippi $2,396 $4,749 98% 51% $1,143 $1,088 18
New Mexico $2,014 $4,002 99% 64% $708 $1,038 19
Kansas $2,669 $4,994 87% 47% $1,060 $1,019 20
Virginia $6,600 $13,085 98% 57% $2,695 $984 21
Oregon $2,786 $5,893 112% 66% $1,280 $945 22
Wisconsin $6,558 $11,768 79% 50% $1,956 $931 23
Kentucky $4,261 $7,851 84% 50% $1,480 $925 24
Illinois $12,891 $23,150 80% 48% $4,077 $883 25
Maine $1,561 $2,669 71% 42% $452 $865 26
Oklahoma $3,477 $6,342 82% 49% $1,160 $862 27
Pennsylvania $13,220 $22,562 71% 40% $4,038 $845 28
South Dakota $500 $977 95% 47% $241 $827 29
Louisiana $4,087 $7,194 76% 43% $1,335 $807 30
North Carolina $7,865 $15,625 99% 67% $2,465 $774 31
Ohio $11,436 $19,618 72% 42% $3,369 $756 32
Missouri $4,939 $8,837 79% 49% $1,474 $667 33
Georgia $7,078 $14,369 103% 75% $1,956 $635 34
Texas $14,717 $29,423 100% 70% $4,389 $580 35
New York $28,615 $44,856 57% 43% $3,881 $549 36
West Virginia $2,230 $3,423 53% 36% $386 $526 37
Montana $858 $1,496 74% 53% $180 $501 38
Maryland $6,450 $10,786 67% 52% $960 $478 39
Tennessee $4,245 $7,822 84% 59% $1,052 $467 40
Indiana $6,102 $10,204 67% 49% $1,084 $462 41
Iowa $3,313 $5,159 56% 43% $434 $378 42
Alabama $3,820 $6,368 67% 50% $650 $373 43
Florida $13,289 $24,939 88% 72% $2,118 $326 44
Washington $7,423 $12,679 71% 67% $304 $132 45
Nevada $1,583 $3,832 142% 137% $74 $94 46
Hawaii $2,335 $3,508 50% 50% $13 $31 47
South Carolina $3,934 $6,148 56% 58% -$64 -$41 48
Arizona $4,377 $8,457 93% 96% -$131 -$67 49
Alaska $1,546 $1,429 -8% 56% -$990 -$4,403 50
Source: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census data, www.census.gov/govs/www/statetax.
Looking at the spending side of state budgets
offers another perspective on excess budget
growth during the 1990s. NASBO data on gener-
al fund spending provide a measure of budget
growth for functions that are under the most
direct discretionary control of state policymakers.
(By contrast, the Census Bureau tax revenue data
in Table 1 provide a broader measure of state bud-
get growth, since taxes fund both general fund
and non-general-fund portions of state budgets.)
The NASBO data show that budgets in nearly all
states grew substantially faster than inflation plus
population growth during the past decade. (Table
2). Real per capita general fund spending in the 50
states increased 18.1 percent, on average, between
FY90 and FY01.
State Case Studies
California
California is probably in the poorest fiscal
shape of any state. The budget gap for FY03
and FY04 combined is estimated to be $35
billion.22 The budget gap was caused by a
remarkable run-up in state spending in the
late 1990s under Gov. Gray Davis, as shown
in Figure 3. Spending doubled between FY94
and FY01 from $39 billion to $78 billion.
California’s general fund expenditures
jumped 15 percent in FY2000 and then another
17 percent in FY01.23 Thus, in just two years
spending increased by one-third. State govern-
ment employment has expanded rapidly under
Governor Davis as well. Employment, measured
in full-time equivalents, jumped from 296,000 in
FY2000, to 311,000 in FY01 and to 326,000 in
FY02, even as a large budget gap was opening.24
Despite a dreadful fiscal record, Davis
managed to get reelected in November. He has
proposed spending cuts to close the budget
gap, but he has also hinted that tax increases
may be on the way for California.25 Democrats
in the legislature are proposing tax hikes, but
Republicans have so far opposed that short-
sighted policy option.
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Table 2
Change in Real per Capita General Fund Spending, FY90–01
State 1990–2001 Rank State 1990–2001 Rank State 1990–2001 Rank
Montana 95.0% 1 Texas 24.9% 18 Arkansas 15.9% 34
Ohio 58.1% 2 Mississippi 24.6% 19 Maine 15.9% 35
Illinois 49.4% 3 Virginia 23.4% 20 North Dakota 15.5% 36
Oregon 44.9% 4 Minnesota 23.3% 21 New Hampshire 13.9% 37
Nebraska 41.1% 5 South Dakota 20.6% 22 Indiana 12.9% 38
Kentucky 33.3% 6 Iowa 20.0% 23 Maryland 11.2% 39
Connecticut 32.9% 7 Pennsylvania 19.9% 24 Alabama 8.1% 40
Massachusetts 31.8% 8 Oklahoma 19.4% 25 Arizona 6.0% 41
Wyoming 31.8% 9 Georgia 19.2% 26 Washington 5.8% 42
New Mexico 31.5% 10 New Jersey 18.5% 27 South Carolina 2.6% 43
Utah 30.0% 11 50-state average 18.1% n/a Nevada 1.4% 44
Delaware 28.2% 12 Tennessee 17.6% 28 Vermont 1.3% 45
Wisconsin 27.2% 13 Florida 17.4% 29 Louisiana 0.9% 46
Colorado 26.9% 14 Rhode Island 16.6% 30 New York -5.1% 47
Missouri 26.4% 15 Idaho 16.4% 31 Michigan -13.8% 48
California 25.9% 16 West Virginia 16.1% 32 Hawaii -14.4% 49
Kansas 25.2% 17 North Carolina 16.1% 33 Alaska -41.1% 50
Source: Authors’ calculations based on NASBO, “Fiscal Survey of States,” various issues.
Note: Data for Colorado and Virginia are adjusted to exclude tax cut amounts that are included in NASBO spending totals. Also note that Montana
changed its school funding structure in the mid-1990s causing its general funding spending to jump higher (and other state spending to fall). Thus
Montana’s ranking overstates its overall spending increase.
Figure 3 makes clear that the major
spending cuts that are required in the state
budget have not yet occurred. Although gen-
eral fund spending jumped almost $12 bil-
lion in FY01, FY02 spending was reduced
only by just over $1 billion. As in other states,
newspaper headlines in California make fis-
cal restraint sound draconian. A recent Los
Angeles Times story declared “Wrenching
Changes Likely with Budget Cuts,”26 but the
“wrenching” changes listed included such
items as the first university fee increase since
1994, small increases in admission charges
for state parks, deferral of some transporta-
tion projects, and a modest tightening in eli-
gibility for the state’s low-income health pro-
gram. Those are hardly wrenching changes in
a sprawling state government. 
More aggressive spending cuts are needed
to put the state on the road to fiscal recovery.
In the longer term, the boom-bust budget
cycle in California can be tamed by moving
away from volatile income and capital gains
tax revenues, which fueled much of the
excess spending in the late 1990s. In FY03 tax
revenue from capital gains and stock options
dropped to $5 billion after a high of $17 bil-
lion in FY2000.27 Such taxes on capital not
only are bad for high-tech economic growth
in the state; they leave the state government
more vulnerable in downturns. 
New York
New York faces a $2.5 billion budget gap in
FY03.28 As it was in many other states, rapid tax
revenue growth during the late 1990s was used
to expand state government, instead of being
rebated to citizens. Figure 4 shows that New
York’s general fund spending soared from
$32.9 billion in FY97 to a peak of $41.2 billion
in FY02. Although spending is projected to dip
in 2003, it will still be above the FY01 level.
The rapid rise in spending erased the
progress Gov. George Pataki made in
restraining spending in his first few years in
office in the mid-1990s. At the time, Pataki
pushed through a reduction in state income
tax rates that helped revive New York’s econ-
omy. Pataki also cut the workers’ compensa-
tion tax, the capital gains tax, and inheri-
tance taxes.
More recently, however, Pataki has been
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Figure 3
California General Fund Spending, FY90–03
Source: NASBO, “Fiscal Survey of the States,” November 2002 and prior issues. FY02 and FY03 are preliminary.
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more of a friend to big government than to
the taxpayer. In addition to large spending
increases, he has supported two tax hikes on
cigarette consumers that have increased taxes
from 56 cents to $1.50 per pack. His approval
was also necessary for New York City’s recent
massive tax hike on cigarette consumers
from 8 cents to $1.50 per pack. Those hikes
will almost certainly expand the state’s large
cigarette black markets and strengthen orga-
nized crime.29 Pataki needs to rediscover his
fiscal conservative roots and cut state spend-
ing to balance the budget. He has wisely not
proposed broad-based tax increases to close
the current gap, but he has not ruled any-
thing out.30
Meanwhile, New York City’s new mayor,
Michael Bloomberg, seems intent on driving
economic activity out of the city with the
enactment of a 25 percent increase in proper-
ty taxes. Like the state, the city is facing a
large budget deficit caused by overspending.
New York City spending rose from $34.0 bil-
lion to $40.5 billion between FY97 and FY01,
an increase of 19 percent in four years.31 Tax
increases will push more businesses and indi-
viduals out of the city and reduce the tax
base, thus placing city finances on an even
more unstable footing. To better match the
solution to the problem, New York should
focus on spending reduction—a policy that is
strongly supported by New Yorkers. A recent
poll by Maurice Carroll of Quinnipiac
Univeristy found that New York City voters
prefer service cuts to tax increases to close the
budget gap by a two-to-one margin.32
Virginia
Virginia faces a budget gap in FY03 of
about $1 billion, the largest in its history.33 To
address the shortfall, the state has frozen the
scheduled phaseout of the car tax cut and
enacted modest reductions in the budget.
Virginia, like other states, could have avoided
the budget crisis by controlling spending in
the go-go years of the 1990s. Like California
legislators, Virginia legislators acted as if the
state’s high-tech boom—and the resulting
windfalls of income and capital gains taxes—
would continue indefinitely.
Figure 5 shows that Virginia general fund
spending soared from $7.6 billion in FY96 to
$11.6 billion in FY01, a 53 percent increase in
just five years. In the late 1990s Gov. Jim
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Source: NASBO, “Fiscal Survey of the States,” November 2002 and prior issues. FY02 and FY03 are preliminary.
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Figure 4
New York General Fund Spending, FY90-03
Gilmore did provide Virginians a phased-in
cut in property taxes on automobiles, but he
pushed state spending up to full throttle.
(Figure 5 excludes the effect of the partial car
tax repeal, which is counted as spending in
the state budget.)
The current governor, Mark Warner, has
so far resisted broad-based tax increases.
However, some policymakers in the state are
pushing for a tax increase on tobacco con-
sumers. State policymakers should heed the
message of the resounding “no” vote on the
sales tax increase referenda in November
2002.34 Voters in Northern Virginia and the
Hampton Roads area soundly rejected higher
taxes to pay for transportation spending, sig-
naling that they believe that taxes in the state
are already high enough. 
Although Governor Warner did back tax
increases in the referenda, he has recently
proposed restraining state spending and cut-
ting bureaucratic waste in agencies such as
the Department of Motor Vehicles. He is
right that “to fully regain the trust of our
people . . . we must give the taxpayers of
Virginia the full confidence that we are good
stewards of their tax dollar.”35 He can begin
by reversing some of the large budget increas-
es of the late 1990s. Figure 5 indicates that
even with restraint in FY02 and FY03, spend-
ing is up substantially from FY2000.
Maryland
In November Maryland elected its first
Republican governor in 36 years. Robert
Ehrlich will be responsible for cleaning up the
fiscal mess left by his predecessor Parris
Glendening, who left office with a $1.2 billion
budget gap and a record of high spending.
(Glendening had also left his prior job as a
county executive in Maryland in a blaze of red
ink.) On his way out of the governor’s office in
2002, Glendening used executive orders to
spend millions of dollars that Maryland can-
not afford.36 His last-minute hikes in spend-
ing, such as giving state workers a $100 mil-
lion pay hike, were “the dirtiest trick I’ve ever
known any governor to do” noted the state’s
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Source: Virginia Department of Planning and Budget, www.dpb.state.va.us/budget/budget.htm. FY03 is preliminary.
Note: State spending on car tax repeal is excluded from figures.
$ 
B
ill
io
ns
comptroller William Donald Schaefer.37 An
editorial in the Washington Post called
Glendening’s last-minute budget gimmickry
“simply deceitful.”38
The burden of reining in Glendening’s
big-spending legacy will fall on Governor
Ehrlich. Figure 6 shows that Maryland’s gen-
eral fund spending soared from $6.6 billion
in 1994 to $10.9 billion by 2002, a 65 percent
increase.39 Ehrlich has promised not to raise
sales or income taxes and is generally sup-
portive of spending cuts. Given the large run-
up in state spending under his predecessor,
major spending cuts are the best way for
Ehrlich to balance the state budget.
Avoiding the Economic
Mistake of Tax Increases
The near-term question facing state gov-
ernments is, Should budget gaps be closed by
restraining spending or by increasing taxes?
In FY02, almost half of the states raised taxes
to balance their budgets with total net tax
increases of $8.3 billion, which was the
largest net state tax increase in a decade.40 In
addition to tax hikes, many states resorted to
one-time gimmicks to close budget gaps and
put off tough choices until FY03.
So far, most states have avoided large,
broad-based increases in sales or income taxes;
instead, they have focused on raising cigarette
taxes and various fees. Cigarette taxes were
raised in 20 states in 2002, often sharply, as in
New York. Although they are viewed as
innocuous levies that improve public health,
cigarette taxes have very negative side effects,
including creation of large black markets,
which provide a funding source for terrorists
and organized crime.41
In the early 1990s many states made the
mistake of jacking up tax rates in an effort to
close budget gaps. That strategy did not solve
budget problems because it stifled economic
growth and fueled higher spending.42
Income taxes, the most economically
destructive taxes, were raised substantially in
many states. Govs. Pete Wilson of California,
James Florio of New Jersey, Lowell Weicker of
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Connecticut, Bruce Sundlun of Rhode
Island, Bob Casey of Pennsylvania, and
George Voinovich of Ohio all enacted “soak
the rich” income tax increases. Those tax-
raising states lost jobs, income, and invest-
ment capital relative to other states after
those tax actions.43
Then the trend was reversed in the
mid–1990s with 28 states cutting taxes in
1995, 28 states cutting taxes in 1996, and 20
states cutting taxes in both 1997 and 1998.44
Top tax cutters included Michigan’s John
Engler, New Jersey’s Christine Todd Whitman,
Wisconsin’s Tommy Thompson, Texas’s
George W. Bush, and Arizona’s Fife
Symington. Business and individual income
tax rates fell as states realized that they needed
to create a competitive economic climate to
attract skilled workers and businesses. By the
late 1990s even liberal governors, such as
Maryland’s Glendening, acknowledged that
high tax rates damage state economic perfor-
mance. Glendening said that cutting taxes “is
the single most important step we can take to
make Maryland more competitive and create
more jobs.”45 Glendening signed into law a
phased-in income tax rate cut, though that cut
has now been suspended.
Glendening stated what numerous eco-
nomic studies have concluded: State tax poli-
cies have a significant impact on economic
performance. States with high tax burdens are
more likely to suffer economic decline, while
those with low tax burdens are more likely to
enjoy robust growth.46 Capital, labor, and con-
sumers searching for the best economic cli-
Table 3
State and Local Taxes vs. Income Growth, FY80–2000
Taxes as a Percentage of Income, Change in Personal Income,
States and D.C. Average 1980–2000 Real Increase 1980–2000
Highest-tax jurisdictions
Alaska 19.3% 49.7%
D.C. 13.6% 34.5%
New York 13.5% 63.2%
Wyoming 11.7% 17.8%
Hawaii 11.5% 47.4%
Maine 11.5% 65.6%
Wisconsin 11.3% 52.9%
Minnesota 11.3% 80.3%
New Mexico 11.2% 73.0%
Montana 10.9% 37.2%
Average - Highest 10 12.6% 52.2%
Lowest-tax jurisdictions
Arkansas 9.1% 63.2%
Nevada 9.0% 200.6%
Virginia 9.0% 94.9%
Indiana 9.0% 52.9%
Texas 8.8% 96.8%
Missouri 8.7% 59.3%
Alabama 8.5% 64.5%
Florida 8.5% 119.8%
Tennessee 8.1% 88.0%
New Hampshire 7.8% 117.4%
Average - Lowest 10 8.7% 95.7%
Source: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census data,
www.census.gov/govs/www/estimate.html.
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mate are increasingly mobile across state and
international borders. As a result, govern-
ments must maximize their efficiency and not
let tax rates get out of line with those of neigh-
boring jurisdictions.47 Tax increases will result
in fewer businesses, slower economic growth,
and a smaller tax base. 
We have performed an analysis compar-
ing economic growth with state and local tax
levels in the 50 states and the District of
Columbia. The tax measure used in the
analysis is average 1980–2000 state and local
tax revenues as a percentage of personal
income.48 Economic growth is measured as
the increase in real, or inflation-adjusted,
state personal income during the 20-year
period. Table 3 presents the results for the 10
highest- and 10 lowest-tax states. Real
income increased an average 96 percent dur-
ing the 20-year period in the 10 lowest-tax
states but increased just 52 percent in the 9
highest-tax states and D.C.
Other studies have found a similar rela-
tionship between taxes and economic
growth. A 1995 study by the Joint Economic
Committee of Congress looked at state taxes
and personal income growth between 1960
and 1993. The study concluded that “higher
state and local taxes had a distinct and sig-
nificant negative effect on personal income
growth . . . when state and local taxes were
raised, personal income growth slowed
markedly. By the same token, states with
lower taxes enjoyed substantially higher per-
sonal income growth.”49 A 1996 study by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta looked at
state and local taxes compared to state
income growth from 1960 to 1992. The
study found that incomes in the poorer
states tended to slowly catch up to incomes
in the wealthier states over time. When the
study controlled for that factor, it found that
high taxes were negatively related to econom-
ic growth, whether marginal tax rates or over-
all tax levels were considered.50
At the international level, a 2001 survey of
academic studies on investment by James
Hines of the University of Michigan Business
School concluded that taxes substantially
influence the location of foreign direct
investment, research and development, and
other activities that promote economic
growth.51 A study by economists Eric Engen
and Jonathan Skinner looked at growth rates
of 107 countries from 1970 to 1985 and
found “strong and negative effects of both
government spending and taxation on out-
put growth.”52 International investment
flows into the United States are also affected
by state-level taxes. For example, a study by
Deborah Swenson of the University of
California–Davis found that U.S. states that
have higher taxes attract fewer new invest-
ments and plant expansions from foreign
companies than do lower-tax states.53
Limiting Budget Growth to 
Avoid Budget Gaps
To avoid budget gaps during economic
slowdowns, states should limit spending
growth during economic booms. States can
do that with a mandatory budget cap that
provides automatic taxpayer refunds when tax
revenues grow faster than a benchmark rate,
such as inflation plus population growth.
Budget growth caps can prevent governments
from starting too many new spending pro-
grams in good times, thus making it easier to
balance budgets during downturns.
Currently, 26 state governments operate
under some form of tax or expenditure limi-
tation (TEL).54 TELs are statutory or consti-
tutional restrictions on the growth rate of
government revenues or spending, or both.
The effectiveness of TELs varies widely, with
Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights, which
took effect in 1994, probably the most effec-
tive. It limits the growth in state tax revenues
to inflation plus population growth.
Revenue increases above the limit are refund-
ed to taxpayers. Colorado rebated more than
$2.3 billion to taxpayers between FY98 and
FY01.55 Colorado’s legislature can allow rev-
enues and spending to increase faster than
the limit, but it must first get the approval of
voters in a referendum. Six such referenda
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have been held in Colorado since TABOR
was adopted, and the public has rejected five
of them.
If tight tax and budget growth caps were
widely implemented, states could avoid large
budget gaps in the future. Excess revenues
would be given back to taxpayers in both per-
manent tax cuts and annual tax rebates during
economic booms. Then, if revenue stagnated
during future downturns, annual tax rebates
could be temporarily suspended. That action,
along with use of rainy day funds and spending
cuts, should be sufficient to balance state bud-
gets without resorting to economically damag-
ing tax rate increases. As states pull out of their
current budget morass, they should seek new
approaches such as TELs to avoid being con-
fronted with another budget crunch.
Conclusion
Current state budget woes are the result
not of revenue shortfalls but of spending
excesses built up during the 1990s. The
recent stagnation of state tax revenues comes
after a decade of soaring budget growth
fueled by the economic boom. Even with the
recent large budget gaps, state spending still
crept higher in FY02 and FY03.
In an effort to avoid needed spending
cuts, many states are asking for a bailout
from Washington. But it makes no sense for
the federal government to collect more taxes
from citizens in the 50 states, only to turn
around and send the money back to state
governments. That simply adds to federal
bureaucracy and doesn’t solve the underlying
overspending problem.
Many governors and state legislators are
proposing further tax hikes. But tax hikes
will simply delay the return to strong eco-
nomic growth and shrink tax bases as busi-
nesses and individuals move to lower-tax
states, such as Florida, Nevada, and Texas.
Tax increases would also invite another stam-
pede of excess spending in the future. 
Instead, states should turn current budget
problems into opportunities to weed out
excessive and wasteful spending added dur-
ing the boom years. For example, states
should explore opportunities to save money
by privatizing state services. To avoid run-
ning into serious budget crunches in the
future, states should adopt budget caps that
prevent excessive growth in revenues and
spending during economic booms.
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